2,000 Greater & Lesser Mysteries/2,000 Greater and Lesser Mysteries.iso/govern/fbi/mys00723.txt

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August 1990


                     THE TACTICAL INCIDENT:
                    A TOTAL POLICE RESPONSE

                               By

                    Nicholas F. Kaiser, M.A.
                Assistant Chief, Chief of Patrol
                Troy, New York, Police Department


     With the advent of police tactical units, police managers
needed to consider new organizational structures within their
departments.  Accordingly, the development and testing of
policies and procedures, along with opening new lines of
authority and communications, became necessary.  In fact,
individual units adopted policies written especially for them.
These individualized policies outlined how each unit would and
could function.  Specialization became the case in point.

     Today, tactical units remain vital to any department's
response to a critical situation.  However, they cannot operate
within a vacuum and depend on the support of other units.  The
critical situation requires all police units to work as one, not
as individual entities.

     Attaining this teamwork is essential to successfully contain
a crisis situation.  One way is to implement Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and policies that foster teamwork through a
properly guided training program, briefings, and a sensitivity to
feedback.

     Initiating these policies and SOPs alleviates or eliminates
many of the problems managers encounter.  For example, when an
SOP clearly defines who has authority over the scene of an
incident, and this is reinforced during training, authority
probably will not be questioned during an actual crisis
situation. (1)  In the same way, establishing a team concept helps
to minimize jealousy on the part of nontactical officers. (2)

     This article will discuss the importance of a coordinated
response to crisis situations and the importance of each
participating department in the incident.  It will also discuss
how training, initiating appropriate policies and procedures,
feedback, and briefings can improve a police department's total
response to crisis situations.

TEAM RESPONSE TO A CRISIS

Communications Officers

     The communications department is the initial point of
contact in most crisis situations.  In fact, the typical response
begins with informing communications personnel, who then relay
the facts to responding patrol units, investigators, tactical
unit members, negotiators, and any other necessary personnel.
The importance of clear, effective communication throughout the
incident cannot be stressed enough.  And, since most
communication between units reacting to a critical incident is
conducted through the communications officers, the role of this
position in a crisis is essential to the team concept.  In fact,
most communication between units reacting to a critical incident
is conducted through the communications officer.

Patrol Units

     A responding patrol unit can resolve many calls before they
escalate into a crisis situation.  But, subsequent intelligence
information and the use of proper containment procedures are
essential should such a crisis emerge.  An improper response by a
responding unit could jeopardize the entire operation.

     The most crucial moment of any critical situation is in the
hands of the first officer on the scene. (3)  The objective of this
officer is to isolate, analyze and contain the incident, request
the tactical team if needed, and gather available intelligence.
By initially assessing the scene with a concern for safety of
citizens and officers, containing the subject(s) by establishing
a preliminary inner perimeter, and gathering and relaying
pertinent information, the first responding officer provides a
vital link in the total police response to a critical situation.

Investigators

     Usually, by the time the investigators arrive on the scene,
the first responding officers have already gathered the
intelligence and have contained the incident.  This information
often deals with the types of weapons involved, the location of
suspect(s), and whether there are hostages.  Investigators,
therefore, must receive this information from these officers and
then interview possible witnesses to update the intelligence.
This information must then be made available to the other units
involved, particularly the tactical unit whose mission and plan
may be extremely dependent upon such information.  Tactical units
should not be their own intelligence arm and, as such, should
rely upon others charged with this responsibility. (4)

Tactical and Negotiation Personnel

     Certainly, the tactical unit and the hostage negotiation
team are integral parts of any police department's response to a
crisis.  The tactical unit's role is essential should an
incident escalate to a point wherein an organized assault may be
needed.  The same holds true for the hostage negotiation team.
At this point in the crisis situation, all other units become
dependent upon an organized assault unit working with an
experienced negotiation team.

     Of course, every police manager would prefer to resolve
these situations through skilled negotiation leading to a
surrender of all offenders, but many times this is not the case
and a tactical assault becomes the only alternative.  In such
instances, the tactical unit's mission is to protect all involved
and to arrest or neutralize the suspect(s).  Even so, other
members of the department should be familiar with how tactical
units operate and of their limitations when implementing a
coordinated assault.

K-9 Teams

     K-9 teams have also proven themselves to be useful in
tactical situations. (5)  They can be  used to locate barricaded
suspects, as part of entry and arrest teams, as diversions, and
as psychological threats. (6)  As with tactical units, other units
must also be familiar with the use of K-9 teams so that the
total police response can be effectively coordinated.

METHODS FOR IMPROVING TEAM RESPONSE

Training

     Proper training provides the foundation upon which to build
a formidable response to critical situations.  In most
departments, the tactical unit trains on a regular basis,
sometimes with hostage negotiators, K-9 and other specialized
units.  Unfortunately, most departments do not involve patrol
officers or investigators in this type of training.  For tactical
unit members, while the need for training with special tactical
weapons and tools must not be underemphasized, training with
other units that respond to crisis situations should also be on a
regular basis.  By involving these other units in the training
program, proper responses can be ensured.

     During training, the tactical unit should also demonstrate
the use of various devices, such as diversionary devices, machine
guns, and door-breaching, so that others may understand the
benefits and limitations of each.  As a result, the confidence of
other officers in the tactical unit and in their equipment will
be reinforced.

     Inservice training, with a block of instruction on crisis
situations, can also be useful.  Departments should consider
involving all units in true-to-life scenario training at least
twice a year.  However, care should be taken to ensure that all
officers understand the nature of their roles and how their
performance relates to the others.  Video tapes of these training
sessions can be especially helpful.

Policies and Procedures

     Many departments lack comprehensive policies for the
coordination of tactical operations.  Therefore, departments
should specify policies, SOPs, and procedures for tactical
situations, such as the division of labor between each unit and
how individual units fit into the entire plan.  In addition,
since lines of authority may change at the scene of a critical
incident, a written policy covering this area would effectively
coordinate the operation and avoid confusion as to who is in
command.  These principles regarding command should be clearly
stated in the department's SOPs and reinforced in training and
debriefings.

Outside Feedback

     Being sensitive to constructive criticism from sources
outside the department can be useful in formulating an objective
plan for improvement.  For example, almost without exception,
crises capture the media's attention.  In fact, the media often
will initiate a series of editorials as to how the incident might
have been handled better.  In this case, it is important to not
become defensive and to remain as objective as possible in order
to respond carefully to each commentary.  Many times, useful
information can be obtained from such editorials and can be used
in future training.

Briefings and Debriefings

     Each critical incident must be viewed as an opportunity to
learn and to prepare for the next event.  Briefings and
debriefings, in particular, can be very effective in this regard
and can also help to solidify cooperation among various units.
Even though incidents occur without warning, thereby eliminating
a complete, formal briefing, all officers should be briefed
whenever possible in order to reduce the possibility of
misunderstandings.  For example, perimeter personnel should be
advised of the tactical unit's intention to use diversionary
devices so that their use would not be misinterpreted as
unfriendly fire.

     Accordingly, not only must the tactical unit debrief after
each encounter, but everyone involved, such as patrol officers,
investigators, K-9, and communications officers, should also
participate in debriefings.  When these debriefings take place,
officers should discuss what went wrong and, equally as
important, what went right during a critical incident.  Even
though strong emotions may arise, such as anger or fear, the end
result will ultimately be objective learning.

     The normal course of events at a debriefing usually includes
recognizing problems and successes, admitting any problems
internally, admitting the problem to others, and developing a
solution.  This can be difficult, because the tendency to blame
others or oneself is hard to resist.  But, objectivity and an
emphasis on learning will result in a successful debriefing in
most cases.  Then, the various units should examine the overall
plan and each officer involved must identify any mistakes.
Finally, all the involved units should determine how to better
handle the problems that arose during this particular critical
incident should they reoccur.

CONCLUSION

     Increased specialization in police departments across the
country enables them to respond to unusual situations with more
expertise.  However, there are still instances where cooperation
erodes at the scene of a crisis situation.  But, with a specific
departmental plan that includes established policies and SOPs,
police departments can avoid disadvantages of this nature and can
develop and use their various skills to the fullest.

     As time passes, the introduction of new technologies will
bring even more increased specialization to law enforcement.
Therefore, it has become more important that each specialty work
cooperatively with others in the pursuit of law enforcement
goals.  Only through teamwork and close cooperation between all
law enforcement specialties can law enforcement agencies
successfully conclude crisis situations.


FOOTNOTES

(1)  James W. Stevens and David W. MacKenna, ``Assignment and
Coordination of Tactical Units,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
vol. 58, No. 3, March 1989, pp. 2-9.

(2)  Ibid.

(3)  John T. Dolan and G. Dwayne Fuselier, ``A Guide for First
Responders to Hostage Situations,'' FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, vol. 58, No.4, April 1989, pp. 9-13.

(4)  Captain Wade Y. Ishimoto, ``Intelligence Support of SWAT
Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp.
7-11.

(5)  VanNess H. Bogardus, III, ``The Application of K-9's to
SWAT Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 1983,
pp. 19-22.

(6)  Donn Kraemer, ``The Application of Police Canines to
Tactical Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 5, No. 1, Winter
1987, pp. 39-41.