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- August 1990
-
-
- THE TACTICAL INCIDENT:
- A TOTAL POLICE RESPONSE
-
- By
-
- Nicholas F. Kaiser, M.A.
- Assistant Chief, Chief of Patrol
- Troy, New York, Police Department
-
-
- With the advent of police tactical units, police managers
- needed to consider new organizational structures within their
- departments. Accordingly, the development and testing of
- policies and procedures, along with opening new lines of
- authority and communications, became necessary. In fact,
- individual units adopted policies written especially for them.
- These individualized policies outlined how each unit would and
- could function. Specialization became the case in point.
-
- Today, tactical units remain vital to any department's
- response to a critical situation. However, they cannot operate
- within a vacuum and depend on the support of other units. The
- critical situation requires all police units to work as one, not
- as individual entities.
-
- Attaining this teamwork is essential to successfully contain
- a crisis situation. One way is to implement Standard Operating
- Procedures (SOPs) and policies that foster teamwork through a
- properly guided training program, briefings, and a sensitivity to
- feedback.
-
- Initiating these policies and SOPs alleviates or eliminates
- many of the problems managers encounter. For example, when an
- SOP clearly defines who has authority over the scene of an
- incident, and this is reinforced during training, authority
- probably will not be questioned during an actual crisis
- situation. (1) In the same way, establishing a team concept helps
- to minimize jealousy on the part of nontactical officers. (2)
-
- This article will discuss the importance of a coordinated
- response to crisis situations and the importance of each
- participating department in the incident. It will also discuss
- how training, initiating appropriate policies and procedures,
- feedback, and briefings can improve a police department's total
- response to crisis situations.
-
- TEAM RESPONSE TO A CRISIS
-
- Communications Officers
-
- The communications department is the initial point of
- contact in most crisis situations. In fact, the typical response
- begins with informing communications personnel, who then relay
- the facts to responding patrol units, investigators, tactical
- unit members, negotiators, and any other necessary personnel.
- The importance of clear, effective communication throughout the
- incident cannot be stressed enough. And, since most
- communication between units reacting to a critical incident is
- conducted through the communications officers, the role of this
- position in a crisis is essential to the team concept. In fact,
- most communication between units reacting to a critical incident
- is conducted through the communications officer.
-
- Patrol Units
-
- A responding patrol unit can resolve many calls before they
- escalate into a crisis situation. But, subsequent intelligence
- information and the use of proper containment procedures are
- essential should such a crisis emerge. An improper response by a
- responding unit could jeopardize the entire operation.
-
- The most crucial moment of any critical situation is in the
- hands of the first officer on the scene. (3) The objective of this
- officer is to isolate, analyze and contain the incident, request
- the tactical team if needed, and gather available intelligence.
- By initially assessing the scene with a concern for safety of
- citizens and officers, containing the subject(s) by establishing
- a preliminary inner perimeter, and gathering and relaying
- pertinent information, the first responding officer provides a
- vital link in the total police response to a critical situation.
-
- Investigators
-
- Usually, by the time the investigators arrive on the scene,
- the first responding officers have already gathered the
- intelligence and have contained the incident. This information
- often deals with the types of weapons involved, the location of
- suspect(s), and whether there are hostages. Investigators,
- therefore, must receive this information from these officers and
- then interview possible witnesses to update the intelligence.
- This information must then be made available to the other units
- involved, particularly the tactical unit whose mission and plan
- may be extremely dependent upon such information. Tactical units
- should not be their own intelligence arm and, as such, should
- rely upon others charged with this responsibility. (4)
-
- Tactical and Negotiation Personnel
-
- Certainly, the tactical unit and the hostage negotiation
- team are integral parts of any police department's response to a
- crisis. The tactical unit's role is essential should an
- incident escalate to a point wherein an organized assault may be
- needed. The same holds true for the hostage negotiation team.
- At this point in the crisis situation, all other units become
- dependent upon an organized assault unit working with an
- experienced negotiation team.
-
- Of course, every police manager would prefer to resolve
- these situations through skilled negotiation leading to a
- surrender of all offenders, but many times this is not the case
- and a tactical assault becomes the only alternative. In such
- instances, the tactical unit's mission is to protect all involved
- and to arrest or neutralize the suspect(s). Even so, other
- members of the department should be familiar with how tactical
- units operate and of their limitations when implementing a
- coordinated assault.
-
- K-9 Teams
-
- K-9 teams have also proven themselves to be useful in
- tactical situations. (5) They can be used to locate barricaded
- suspects, as part of entry and arrest teams, as diversions, and
- as psychological threats. (6) As with tactical units, other units
- must also be familiar with the use of K-9 teams so that the
- total police response can be effectively coordinated.
-
- METHODS FOR IMPROVING TEAM RESPONSE
-
- Training
-
- Proper training provides the foundation upon which to build
- a formidable response to critical situations. In most
- departments, the tactical unit trains on a regular basis,
- sometimes with hostage negotiators, K-9 and other specialized
- units. Unfortunately, most departments do not involve patrol
- officers or investigators in this type of training. For tactical
- unit members, while the need for training with special tactical
- weapons and tools must not be underemphasized, training with
- other units that respond to crisis situations should also be on a
- regular basis. By involving these other units in the training
- program, proper responses can be ensured.
-
- During training, the tactical unit should also demonstrate
- the use of various devices, such as diversionary devices, machine
- guns, and door-breaching, so that others may understand the
- benefits and limitations of each. As a result, the confidence of
- other officers in the tactical unit and in their equipment will
- be reinforced.
-
- Inservice training, with a block of instruction on crisis
- situations, can also be useful. Departments should consider
- involving all units in true-to-life scenario training at least
- twice a year. However, care should be taken to ensure that all
- officers understand the nature of their roles and how their
- performance relates to the others. Video tapes of these training
- sessions can be especially helpful.
-
- Policies and Procedures
-
- Many departments lack comprehensive policies for the
- coordination of tactical operations. Therefore, departments
- should specify policies, SOPs, and procedures for tactical
- situations, such as the division of labor between each unit and
- how individual units fit into the entire plan. In addition,
- since lines of authority may change at the scene of a critical
- incident, a written policy covering this area would effectively
- coordinate the operation and avoid confusion as to who is in
- command. These principles regarding command should be clearly
- stated in the department's SOPs and reinforced in training and
- debriefings.
-
- Outside Feedback
-
- Being sensitive to constructive criticism from sources
- outside the department can be useful in formulating an objective
- plan for improvement. For example, almost without exception,
- crises capture the media's attention. In fact, the media often
- will initiate a series of editorials as to how the incident might
- have been handled better. In this case, it is important to not
- become defensive and to remain as objective as possible in order
- to respond carefully to each commentary. Many times, useful
- information can be obtained from such editorials and can be used
- in future training.
-
- Briefings and Debriefings
-
- Each critical incident must be viewed as an opportunity to
- learn and to prepare for the next event. Briefings and
- debriefings, in particular, can be very effective in this regard
- and can also help to solidify cooperation among various units.
- Even though incidents occur without warning, thereby eliminating
- a complete, formal briefing, all officers should be briefed
- whenever possible in order to reduce the possibility of
- misunderstandings. For example, perimeter personnel should be
- advised of the tactical unit's intention to use diversionary
- devices so that their use would not be misinterpreted as
- unfriendly fire.
-
- Accordingly, not only must the tactical unit debrief after
- each encounter, but everyone involved, such as patrol officers,
- investigators, K-9, and communications officers, should also
- participate in debriefings. When these debriefings take place,
- officers should discuss what went wrong and, equally as
- important, what went right during a critical incident. Even
- though strong emotions may arise, such as anger or fear, the end
- result will ultimately be objective learning.
-
- The normal course of events at a debriefing usually includes
- recognizing problems and successes, admitting any problems
- internally, admitting the problem to others, and developing a
- solution. This can be difficult, because the tendency to blame
- others or oneself is hard to resist. But, objectivity and an
- emphasis on learning will result in a successful debriefing in
- most cases. Then, the various units should examine the overall
- plan and each officer involved must identify any mistakes.
- Finally, all the involved units should determine how to better
- handle the problems that arose during this particular critical
- incident should they reoccur.
-
- CONCLUSION
-
- Increased specialization in police departments across the
- country enables them to respond to unusual situations with more
- expertise. However, there are still instances where cooperation
- erodes at the scene of a crisis situation. But, with a specific
- departmental plan that includes established policies and SOPs,
- police departments can avoid disadvantages of this nature and can
- develop and use their various skills to the fullest.
-
- As time passes, the introduction of new technologies will
- bring even more increased specialization to law enforcement.
- Therefore, it has become more important that each specialty work
- cooperatively with others in the pursuit of law enforcement
- goals. Only through teamwork and close cooperation between all
- law enforcement specialties can law enforcement agencies
- successfully conclude crisis situations.
-
-
- FOOTNOTES
-
- (1) James W. Stevens and David W. MacKenna, ``Assignment and
- Coordination of Tactical Units,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
- vol. 58, No. 3, March 1989, pp. 2-9.
-
- (2) Ibid.
-
- (3) John T. Dolan and G. Dwayne Fuselier, ``A Guide for First
- Responders to Hostage Situations,'' FBI Law Enforcement
- Bulletin, vol. 58, No.4, April 1989, pp. 9-13.
-
- (4) Captain Wade Y. Ishimoto, ``Intelligence Support of SWAT
- Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp.
- 7-11.
-
- (5) VanNess H. Bogardus, III, ``The Application of K-9's to
- SWAT Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 1983,
- pp. 19-22.
-
- (6) Donn Kraemer, ``The Application of Police Canines to
- Tactical Operations,'' The Tactical Edge, vol. 5, No. 1, Winter
- 1987, pp. 39-41.